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Chapter 13 
 
Moral Absolutes and Neo-Aristotelian Ethical Naturalism 
 
David McPherson 
 
In “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Elizabeth Anscombe makes a “disenchanting” move: she 
suggests that secular philosophers abandon a special “moral” sense of “ought” since she 
thinks this no longer makes sense without a divine law framework. Instead, she recommends 
recovering an ordinary sense of ought that pertains to what a human being needs in order to 
flourish qua human being, where the virtues are thought to be central to what a human being 
needs. However, she is also concerned to critique consequentialist views for their rejection of 
absolution prohibitions. This raises the question of whether the disenchanted form of 
Aristotelian ethical naturalism that she recommends to secular philosophers can support such 
absolute prohibitions. Anscombe expresses skepticism on this point and seems ultimately to 
recommend a divine law ethic, at least as a supplement to a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic.  
This chapter takes issue with Anscombe’s view, in part: the author agrees that the 
disenchanted form of Aristotelian virtue ethics cannot support absolute prohibitions, but 
disagrees that appeal to divine law is the best way to understand these prohibitions since it 
misses the intrinsic reasons for them: namely, they concern that which is sacred or 
reverence-worthy and thus should be regarded as inviolable and as involving a “special 
moral ought.” This means that a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic that can properly recognize 
moral absolutes will need a reenchanting move: namely, it needs to recognize the special 
normative demands of the sacred. This chapter also explores the question of what “moral 
ontology” can best make sense of the moral phenomenology of the sacred, but the main aim 
is to show the significance of a common anti-consequentialist form of moral perception that 
involves a sense of the sacred. 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Elizabeth Anscombe’s 1958 essay “Modern Moral Philosophy” is widely regarded as having 
provided a key source of impetus for the revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics in the last half-
century or so. In this essay she criticizes modern moral theories, such as Kantianism and 
utilitarianism, which focus on providing action-guiding moral principles. She argues that such 
views depend upon a notion of moral obligation that is in fact merely a survival from an earlier 
divine law conception of ethics. The word “ought” continues “to be spoken with a special 
emphasis and a special feeling,” but it has lost the framework that originally made it intelligible.1 
Anscombe contends that this notion of moral obligation should be jettisoned by secular 
philosophers since it is only harmful without its original theistic framework, and she suggests 
that it “would be a great improvement if, instead of ‘morally wrong’, one always named a genus 
such as ‘untruthful’, ‘unchaste’, ‘unjust.’”2 
Whatever one may think about the specifics of Anscombe’s criticisms of modern moral 
philosophy, one of the most important aspects of her essay is the suggestion that we would do 
well to move away from the narrow focus on action-guiding principles and instead take a more 
holistic approach that seeks to identify ways of being or types of character traits – the virtues – 
that contribute to a flourishing or good human life. In short, her recommendation is that we 
should seek to recover something like Aristotle’s account of ethics. However, what has not been 
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properly appreciated is that Anscombe is making a disenchanting move in suggesting that we 
should abandon – at least if we are not theists – a special “moral” sense of “ought” that is 
supposed to contain some sort of “peculiar” or “mesmeric” force.3 In other words, she wants us 
to acknowledge the full extent of the disenchantment that she thinks in fact occurs if we have 
abandoned theism. At the same time, Anscombe wants to block a further kind of disenchantment 
that would involve rejecting all claims of objectivity in ethics, that is, claims that we can derive 
an ought from what is the case or value from a fact about the world. She suggests that we can 
recover an ordinary (i.e., non-peculiar) sense of “ought” by focusing on what a human being 
needs in order to flourish qua human being, where the virtues are thought to be central to what a 
human being needs.4 This sense of ought can be expressed as follows: if you want to flourish qua 
human being (and it is thought that any rational human being should want to flourish qua human 
being), then you ought to cultivate the virtues. 
Anscombe’s suggestions here have been taken up by other philosophers, such as Philippa 
Foot,5 Rosalind Hursthouse,6 and Alasdair MacIntyre,7 who have sought to articulate and defend 
a version of “ethical naturalism” that founds virtue ethics on an account of human flourishing (or 
well-being) that is understood on analogy with the flourishing of other living things. In other 
words, the focus is on providing a quasi-scientific account of human nature and human 
flourishing that can ground an account of the virtues that would contribute to such flourishing.8 I 
will refer to this as the disenchanted version of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics – even though it 
seeks a minimal form of re-enchantment in defending objectivity in ethics – as a way of 
contrasting it with the re-enchanted version of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics that I defend. This 
version – which is the dominant version – is disenchanted because of its appeal to an “ordinary 
ought” (in contrast to any special, set apart realm of obligation) and because of focusing on a 
third-personal, observational, or disengaged standpoint (as contrasted with focusing on a first-
personal, participative, or engaged standpoint).9 The re-enchanted version of neo-Aristotelian 
virtue ethics that I defend does affirm a special realm of obligation that contains a “peculiar” or 
“mesmeric” force, that is, it places demands upon us that are set apart from other sorts of 
concerns.10 But to appreciate this we have to explore our engaged evaluative standpoint. 
I will focus here on the issue of absolute prohibitions: are there some actions that are 
never to be done? Although the most influential aspect of Anscombe’s “Modern Moral 
Philosophy” is its call for a recovery of Aristotelian ethics, her greatest concern in the essay is in 
fact with consequentialist thinking that rejects absolute prohibitions. These two features of the 
essay raise the question: is the sort of neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism that Anscombe 
recommends able to affirm and defend absolute prohibitions? Anscombe herself raises this 
question toward the end of the essay and expresses skepticism. In fact, her ultimate purpose in 
the essay seems to be to recommend a divine law conception of ethics.  
I agree with Anscombe that the disenchanted form of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics 
cannot adequately ground absolute prohibitions; however, I also don’t think that appeal to divine 
law is adequate for grounding these prohibitions. I will argue that in order properly to defend 
absolute prohibitions we need to appeal to the common experience of the sacred (or what we can 
also call the reverence-worthy), which carries with it a sense of obligation that is especially set 
apart from other sorts of concern in virtue of involving a requirement of inviolability; that is, it 
conveys a kind of boundary marker that ought never to be crossed. I will also show how in her 
later work Anscombe does give recognition to a sense of the sacred in terms of what she calls 
“mystical perception” or a “religious attitude” of reverence for human life, which she thinks is in 
fact available to everyone, whether one is religious or not. But this does raise the question of 
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whether a religious (i.e., theistic) worldview is needed for best making sense of the sacred. While 
I don’t think appeal to divine law is adequate for grounding absolute prohibitions, I will suggest 
that there are indeed features of a theistic worldview that can help to make sense of such 
prohibitions. However, the main focus of this essay is to show the significance of a common 
anti-consequentialist form of moral perception that involves a sense of the sacred.          
 
 
Against Consequentialism  
 
Let us begin by looking at what Anscombe has to say about consequentialism in “Modern Moral 
Philosophy.” One of her main theses in the essay is that “differences between the well-known 
English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance,” 
because, in essence, they are all consequentialists of some form – that is, they believe that the 
ends justify the means – and thus show a “corrupt mind.”11 She writes: 
 
The overall similarity is made clear if you consider that every one of the best known 
English academic moral philosophers has put out a philosophy according to which, e.g., it 
is not possible to hold that it cannot be right to kill the innocent as a means to any end 
whatsoever and that someone who thinks otherwise is in error. … Now this is a 
significant thing: for it means that all these philosophies are quite incompatible with the 
Hebrew-Christian ethic. For it has been characteristic of that ethic to teach that there are 
certain things forbidden whatever consequences threaten, such as: choosing to kill the 
innocent for any purpose, however good … [It] would [take] a certain provinciality of 
mind not to see this incompatibility as the most important fact about these philosophers, 
and the differences between them as somewhat trifling by comparison.12  
 
In referring here to the “Hebrew-Christian ethic” Anscombe is appealing to a divine law 
conception of ethics. But does she allow that other conceptions of ethics, such as the 
disenchanted form of Aristotelian ethics that she recommends to secular philosophers, could also 
reasonably affirm absolute prohibitions? As previously indicated, she is skeptical. 
 Toward the end of the essay, Anscombe raises the question “whether one might ever need 
to commit injustice, or whether it won’t be the best thing to do?” For her, a paradigm case of 
injustice is the intentional taking of innocent human life (she also mentions the judicial 
condemnation of someone known to be innocent as another paradigm case). Among the different 
possible replies to this question, Anscombe mentions the following: 
 
One man – a philosopher – may say that since justice is a virtue, and injustice a vice, and 
virtues and vices are built up by the performances of the action in which they are 
instanced, an act of injustice will tend to make a man bad; and essentially the flourishing 
of a man qua man consists in his being good (e.g. in virtues); but for any X to which such 
terms apply, X needs what makes it flourish, so a man needs, or ought to perform, only 
virtuous actions; and even if, as it must be admitted may happen, he flourishes less, or not 
at all, in inessentials, by avoiding injustice, his life is spoiled in essentials by not avoiding 
injustice – so he still needs to perform only just actions. That is roughly how Plato and 
Aristotle talk.13  
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Plato and Aristotle do indeed seem to acknowledge absolute prohibitions. For instance, Plato has 
Socrates say in the Gorgias that it is better to suffer evil than to do evil,14 which is an idea central 
to any view embracing absolute prohibitions. Similarly, Aristotle remarks: “[There] are some 
things we cannot be compelled to do. Rather than do them we should suffer the most terrible 
consequences and accept death.”15 He mentions the act of killing one’s own mother as such a 
case. Elsewhere Aristotle qualifies his view of the virtues of character as consisting in attaining 
the mean between excess and deficiency with respect to some feeling or action by saying: “[Not] 
every action or feeling admits of the mean. For the names of some automatically include 
baseness—for instance, spite, shamelessness, envy [among feelings], and adultery, theft, murder 
among actions. For all of these and similar things are called by these names because they 
themselves, not their excesses or deficiencies, are base. Hence in doing these things we can never 
be correct, but must invariably be in error.”16 There is a lot left unexplained in these remarks. For 
instance, what explains the wrongness of murder (i.e., the intentional killing of an innocent 
human being) such that it always ought to be avoided? It does not seem enough to say – in line 
with the disenchanted form of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics – that it undermines the “good 
functioning of the social group” (and the virtues that maintain this) and runs counter to our social 
nature (and the virtues that fulfill this), though these claims are true; rather, the wrongness seems 
above all related to the violation of the inherent value of human life, which should be regarded as 
inviolable, irreplaceable, and reverence-worthy.17 Murder is fundamentally impious, given that 
piety (as part of the virtue of justice) is the virtue of being properly responsive to that which is 
sacred or reverence-worthy, which in this case is human life.18 The virtue of piety is also 
concerned to show reverence for the sources of our existence, and hence the example Aristotle 
mentions of killing one’s own mother is especially impious. Rather than do this “we should 
suffer the most terrible consequences and accept death.” 
Additionally, if living in accordance with absolute prohibitions is seen as necessary for 
our own fulfillment (eudaimonia), it is because we have already accepted a moralized 
understanding of it, for example, in terms of a righteous, holy, noble, upright life, which is in 
part constituted by the virtue of piety in being properly responsive to that which is sacred or 
reverence-worthy. But if we do away with appeals to a special moral ought and only accept an 
ordinary (i.e., disenchanted) ought, where virtuous actions are ultimately justified by their 
conduciveness to our flourishing as human beings, where this is understood on analogy with the 
flourishing of other living things, then it seems difficult to see how certain actions could be ruled 
out as such. Indeed, Anscombe continues the previously cited passage as follows:  
 
[It] can be seen that philosophically there is a huge gap … which needs to be filled by an 
account of human nature, human action, the type of characteristic a virtue is, and above 
all of human ‘flourishing’. And it is the last concept that appears the most doubtful. For it 
is a bit much to swallow that a man in pain and hunger and poor and friendless is 
flourishing, as Aristotle himself admitted. Further, someone might say that one at least 
needed to stay alive to flourish. Another man unimpressed by all that will say in a hard 
case ‘What we need is such-and-such, which we won’t get without doing this (which is 
unjust) – so this is what we ought to do’.19  
 
In other words, it seems that there could always be exceptions made for the sake of the end of 
flourishing (this parallels a similar common critique of rule-utilitarianism). And so here 
Anscombe points to a fundamental inadequacy in the disenchanted Aristotelian view, given that 
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she thinks justice requires acknowledging absolute prohibitions. In light of this inadequacy, she 
suggests the following as another possible reply to her question “whether one might ever need to 
commit injustice, or whether it won’t be the best thing to do?”:   
 
The man who believes in divine laws will say perhaps ‘It is forbidden, and however it 
looks, it cannot be to anyone’s profit to commit injustice’; he like the Greek philosophers 
can think in terms of flourishing. … [If] he is a Jew or Christian, he need not have any 
very distinct notion: the way it will profit him to abstain from injustice is something that 
he leaves it to God to determine, himself only saying ‘It can’t do me any good to go 
against his law’. (He also hopes for a great reward in a new life later on, e.g. at the 
coming of [the] Messiah; but in this he is relying on special promises.)20 
 
Ultimately, it seems then that Anscombe is recommending a divine law ethic, at least as a 
supplement to a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic, in order to ground absolute prohibitions.  
 Alasdair MacIntyre does the same in an essay titled “On Being a Theistic Philosopher in 
a Secularized Culture.” There he draws the following lesson from the famous claim made by the 
character Ivan Karamazov in Fyodor Dostoevsky’s novel The Brothers Karamazov that if God 
does not exist, then everything is permissible: 
 
Dostoievski through Karamazov was not saying, that atheists are free from all moral 
constraints, that, if atheism is true, anyone is morally free to do anything at any time. … 
[What] Dostoievski … was saying, was that, if we take atheism to be true, then there is 
no type of action, no matter how horrifying, of which we can be sure that we could never 
find good reason to perform it, that it would never be overwhelmingly and overridingly in 
what we took to be the general interest to perform it. Dostoievski … was not predicting 
Auschwitz or the Gulag. He was predicting the fire-bombing of Dresden and Tokyo, the 
saturation bombing of the Ruhr and the obliteration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He was 
predicting not the crimes of the obviously wicked, but the crimes of the apparently good, 
types of action that it is rational to prohibit unconditionally only if one is a theist. But it 
[is] just this kind of position that will appear at best groundless, at worst unintelligible, to 
those whose presuppositions are those of our secularized culture.21  
 
MacIntyre thinks that the reason why it is rational for the theist to regard certain actions as 
absolutely prohibited is because on the theistic view “we are unconditionally bound to obey a 
certain rule not in spite of our interests and natural inclinations, but because of them … [Our] 
nature is such that our end is such that we cannot achieve it except by respecting a law to whose 
giver we are accountable.”22 
 
 
Intrinsic versus Extrinsic Reasons in Favor of Absolute Prohibitions 
 
What should we make of Anscombe’s and MacIntyre’s appeals to divine law in order to ground 
absolute prohibitions? They do fit with what Sabina Lovibond identifies as an “element of anti-
naturalism” in the idea of absolute prohibitions: “To say fiat iustitia, ruat caelum [“let justice be 
done though the heavens may fall”] is to give hostages to fortune: if there is even so much as one 
moral requirement that we are seriously going to treat as absolute, i.e. as a requirement that is 
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never to be called into question, then this policy is liable sooner or later to produce consequences 
which, by any normal human standards, will count as disastrous.”23 For instance, if we are never 
to take innocent human life intentionally, then in some cases of warfare this can lead to disaster. 
We can also see the “anti-naturalism” or “other-worldliness” of absolute prohibitions in the 
“worldliness” of Callicles’ response to Socrates’ claim in Plato’s Gorgias that it is better to 
suffer evil than to do evil: “Tell me Socrates, are we to take you as being in earnest now, or 
joking? For if you are in earnest, and these things you’re saying are really true, won’t this human 
life of ours be turned upside down, and won’t everything we do evidently be the opposite of what 
we should do?”24 There is certainly truth in this response, as there is a sense in which absolute 
prohibitions do run counter to the “ways of the world,” though we might regard this as counting 
in favor absolute prohibitions. And such prohibitions are also difficult to make sense of from 
within an ethic centered on the sort of disenchanted account of human flourishing that is put 
forward by a number of neo-Aristotelians. It is thus unsurprising that we find some who think 
that absolute prohibitions can only be grounded from within a religious framework.  
 But how exactly are we to understand Anscombe’s remark that “[it] can’t do me any 
good to go against [God’s] law,” or MacIntyre’s suggestion that we cannot achieve our interests 
“except by respecting a law to whose giver we are accountable”? One possibility is suggested by 
Anscombe’s parenthetical remark: following God’s law is a necessary condition for obtaining 
some “great reward in a new life later on,” whereas failure to do so is subject to divine 
punishment. However, there seems to be something shallow about following God’s law simply 
for the sake of reward and to avoid punishment. A better possible understanding for the claim 
that “[it] can’t do me any good to go against God’s law” is that it has to do with faith in divine 
providence, where God is seen as creating the world for good and as being on the side of the 
good and thus as working to ensure that good ultimately triumphs over evil. Thus, following 
God’s law, which includes certain absolute prohibitions, is a matter of aligning our lives with the 
will of God and ensuring that we also are on the side of the good and are helping to bring about 
the ultimate triumph of good over evil. Relatedly, it can also be a matter of achieving a right 
relationship with God, which is our highest good.25  
 These considerations no doubt give the religious believer compelling extrinsic reasons to 
live in accordance with absolute prohibitions (e.g., never intentionally kill an innocent human 
being), provided they have been divinely decreed, but they miss what should be seen as the 
intrinsic reason for these prohibitions: they concern that which is sacred or reverence-worthy and 
thus should be regarded as inviolable. For instance, the reason why we should never intentionally 
kill an innocent human being is because doing so violates the special dignity or sanctity of 
human life. The other theological considerations may provide additional motivational support, 
but unless a theist embraces theological voluntarism (where something is thought to be right or 
wrong simply because God willed it to be so, and which is a position that I believe should be 
rejected because it makes morality arbitrary and undermines God’s praiseworthiness), he or she 
will believe that God decreed certain absolution prohibitions because they concern that which is 
sacred or reverence-worthy and thus should be regarded as inviolable. So there is a special moral 
ought here – that is, an ought that contains a “peculiar” or “mesmeric” force in that it makes 
unconditional demands upon us – not simply because something has been commanded by God, 
but because we are able to identify an important good: for example, human life as something 
inherently reverence-worthy, for which we ought to show reverence, where doing so is 
constitutive of a normatively higher, more meaningful way of life.   
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The Moral Phenomenology and Ontology of the Sacred 
 
If this is so, then it is not immediately clear that a non-theist could not have experiences of the 
sacred or the reverence-worthy that are the basis of absolute prohibitions. In fact, the force of 
Anscombe’s argument against consequentialism seems to depend on our having such 
experiences of the sacred or the reverence-worthy. Without this we might wonder why the 
consequentialist rejection of absolute prohibitions is so significant. We might imagine that a 
modern, secular moral philosopher, such as the utilitarian Peter Singer, could respond: “So what? 
We are well past such a superstitious conception of ethics, and we are better for it.” Such 
philosophers often regard their moral views as “enlightened” in comparison to traditional views 
that affirm the sanctity or special dignity of human life.26 Clearly Anscombe does not think such 
views are enlightened but rather they are benighted; hence she charges consequentialists with 
having a “corrupt mind.” But this charge seems to presuppose that there is some common anti-
consequentialist moral perception – for example, about the special dignity or sanctity of human 
life such that “it cannot be right to kill the innocent as a means to any end whatsoever” – and 
there is a natural potentiality to realize this through proper ethical formation, and we can fail to 
realize it because of corruption by bad moral theory. 
In “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Anscombe does apparently accept a natural law ethic 
according to which God’s law is “written on our hearts” (as something to which our conscience 
bears witness).27 She refers on two occasions (en passant) to the “natural divine law,”28 though 
this is never filled out and deployed in the main arguments of the essay. However, she does fill 
out the idea of a common anti-consequentialist moral perception (which can be seen as an 
integral part of the natural moral law that is “written on our hearts”) elsewhere. In her later work 
Anscombe appeals to what she calls “mystical perception” in order to make sense of certain 
normative demands upon us (including absolute prohibitions) that in fact appear to contain a 
“peculiar” or “mesmeric” force. Such perception seems essentially to involve a recognition of 
that which is sacred or reverence-worthy, which involves overriding normative demands. 
Anscombe thinks that this perception is “as common as humanity”: for example, it is present in 
the perception that we dishonor our bodies in casual sex, in our sense that we owe respect to 
someone’s dead body, and in our horror at the evil of murder.29  
In light of this, she distinguishes between two kinds of virtue. Some virtues, such as 
temperance in regard to food and drink and honesty about property, “are fundamentally 
utilitarian in character.” “Utilitarian” here just means that they are instrumental to things going 
well for us. By contrast, some virtues, “though indeed profitable, are supra-utilitarian and hence 
mystical.” One example is chastity. Anscombe writes: “Not that this virtue isn’t useful: it’s 
highly useful. If Christian standards of chastity were widely observed the world would be 
enormously happier. … But it … is a supra-utilitarian value … [This] is what comes out in the 
perception that the life of lust is one in which we dishonour our bodies.”30 We can say that there 
is something fundamentally sacred or reverence-worthy about human sexuality to which the 
virtue of chastity (as involving right intention in sexual desire) is properly responsive.31 Another 
example of a mystical or supra-utilitarian virtue is what Anscombe describes as the virtue of 
“respect for life,” which I think can be seen as part of the virtue of piety. Although the 
prohibition on murder certainly “makes life more commodious,” she says: “everybody perceives 
quite clearly that the wrong done in murder is done first and foremost to the victim, whose life is 
not inconvenienced, it just isn’t there any more. He isn’t there to complain: so the utilitarian 
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argument has to be on behalf of the rest of us. Therefore, though true, it is highly comic and is 
not the foundation: the objection to murder is supra-utilitarian.”32  
Elsewhere Anscombe speaks similarly of a “religious attitude” of “respect before the 
mystery of human life” – or what I would call the sacredness or reverence-worthiness of human 
life – which is “not necessarily connected only with some one particular religious system.”33 
Given that this “religious attitude” appears to be equivalent to what she calls “mystical 
perception,” and given that she thinks the latter is “as common as humanity,” we can say that 
Anscombe would in fact affirm that one does not have to be part of a religious system at all in 
order to have a “religious attitude” of reverence for human life (though we might also say that 
having this attitude makes one religious in a broad, non-conventional sense). Indeed, there are 
philosophers who are not religious (or theists) who have sought to make appeals to something 
like this “religious attitude.” For instance, Cora Diamond writes of “[the] sense of mystery 
surrounding our lives, the feeling of solidarity in mysterious origin and uncertain fate: this binds 
us to each other, and the binding meant includes the dead and the unborn, and those who bear on 
their faces ‘a look of blank idiocy’, those who lack all power of speech, those behind whose 
vacant eyes there lurks a ‘soul in mute eclipse.’”34 And in a recent essay titled “The Problem of 
Impiety,” Diamond seeks to show how certain ways of acting – she discusses suicide, genetic 
engineering, and other issues – can be absolutely ruled out as impious without appealing to 
divine prohibition, and in doing so she draws on Anscombe’s discussion of “mystical 
perception” and the “religious attitude” of reverence for human life.35  
These ideas, I contend, mark an important conceptual advance – over appeals to divine 
law – for understanding absolute prohibitions, since they are able to identify the intrinsic reason 
for such prohibitions: namely, they concern that which is sacred or reverence-worthy and thus 
should be regarded as inviolable. However, it might still seem that such talk of “mystical 
perception” or a “religious attitude” of reverence for human life is suggestive of a religious 
worldview, and we might think, more specifically, that a theistic worldview is best able to 
ground the sense of the sacred or the reverence-worthy here. Anscombe in fact seems to suggest 
as much when she writes:  
 
A religious attitude may be merely incipient, prompting a certain fear before the idea of ever 
destroying a human life, and refusing to make a ‘quality of life’ judgment to terminate a human 
being. Or it may be more developed, perceiving that men are made by God in God’s likeness, to 
know and love God. … Such perception of what a human being is makes one perceive human 
death as awesome, human life as always to be treated with a respect which is a sign and 
acknowledgement of what it is for.36  
 
I think a theistic worldview is important in the way suggested by Anscombe here: it can ground 
absolute prohibitions not in virtue of appealing to divine law, but rather because it enables a way 
of seeing human beings as made in the image of God and so as being worthy of reverence. In 
other words, we can say that theism provides a “moral ontology” that can support and make 
sense of the “moral phenomenology” of the sacred or the reverence-worthy in regard to human 
life.37 I think we need some such moral ontology or worldview that can make sense of the moral 
phenomenology of the sacred or the reverence-worthy here, that is, that can provide an account 
of what it is about human beings and their place in the cosmos that makes them worthy of 
reverence. Failing to provide this can have a deflationary effect on our moral experience.38  
To fill out this point: the kind of moral ontology that seems particularly important is a 
teleological one, and we see this in Anscombe’s remark about what a human life, as made in the 
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image of God, is for: namely, “to know and love God,” and, I think we should also add, to know 
and love one another as well as the wider world created by God. The idea is that there is 
something worthy of awe and reverence here: our having been created for such a higher purpose 
makes the experience of awe and reverence before human life appropriate or fitting, and indeed 
it make sense of the idea that there are normative demands for a reverential attitude toward 
human life and for appropriate actions following from this. However, if there is no underlying 
moral teleology in the universe, no way in which the universe is ordered toward the good, and if 
we are just the result of “blind,” mechanistic causal processes, then it is difficult to see how we 
can make sense of the idea that there are normative demands upon us for a reverential attitude 
toward human life whether or not we are responsive to these demands. It seems we have here 
what Bernard Williams has identified as the problem of the radical contingency of ethics, where 
our ethical beliefs are seen as entirely dependent on the contingencies of our personal, cultural, 
and evolutionary histories. Williams writes: “This sense of contingency can seem to be in tension 
with something that our ethical ideas themselves demand, a recognition of their authority.”39 In 
other words, the normative authority of ethics, as commonly understood, seems to carry with it a 
sense of necessity that is at odds with seeing our ethical beliefs as radically contingent. For 
instance, as ethical agents we do not typically experience it as a contingent fact that we should 
show reverence for human life, but rather we see it as something that is “categorical”: that is, we 
ought to show reverence irrespective of what we happen to desire. To give up this sort of 
normativity means that only a significantly reduced form of ethics remains possible, and hence 
there is a deflationary effect on our ethical experience. With such a reduced form of ethics there 
will likely still be things about which we deeply care; for instance, we may deeply care about 
being kind. The point, however, is that this will be based merely on happening to possess certain 
caring dispositions—for whatever contingent personal, cultural, or evolutionary reasons—rather 
than on categorical judgments concerning things about which we ought to care. Insofar as such 
categorical judgments are often linked to many of the things about which we deeply care, giving 
up making these sorts of judgments would constitute a significant loss.  
I think there are non-theistic moral ontologies that could also support the moral 
phenomenology of the reverence-worthiness of human life. For instance, I think, if we can find it 
convincing, support can be found in the non-theistic cosmic teleological perspective of Thomas 
Nagel, who argues that the universe is apt (in a non-accidental way) to give rise to beings like us 
such that “[each] of our lives is a part of the lengthy process of the universe gradually waking up 
and becoming aware of itself.”40 Human beings can be said to have a special purpose here 
because the universe comes to consciousness in human life as we come to understand and 
appreciate it, which is to say, as we engage in contemplation. And I think we can find something 
worthy of awe and reverence in such a picture of human life. But does it make sense to think that 
there could be such a purpose in the universe without a purposive Being (viz., God) who created 
it? Nagel himself says: “I am not confident that this Aristotelian idea of teleology without 
intention makes sense, but I do not at the moment see why it doesn’t.”41 
My aim here is not to settle the issue of moral ontology, though I do want to highlight its 
significance. My primary aim is to show that we need to take account of a common anti-
consequentialist form of moral perception that involves a sense of the sacred or the reverence-
worthy, since this is needed for defending absolute prohibitions and for making sense of the sorts 
of evils (e.g., murder) that these prohibitions seek to avoid. Indeed, although I acknowledged that 
absolute prohibitions are in a sense “anti-natural” in that they run counter to the “ways of the 
world” and they are difficult to understand from within an ethic centered on a disenchanted 
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account of human flourishing, I have also shown that there is a sense in which the recognition of 
such prohibitions is completely “natural” to human beings in that they are based on a common 
anti-consequentialist form of moral perception. Hence such prohibitions have been a central 
feature of traditional conceptions of morality.42  
To see the significance of this common anti-consequentialist moral perception we need to 
engage our moral experience. For instance, recalling my earlier discussion, if we consider our 
horror at murder, it does not seem that it can be explained simply in terms of how it violates the 
“good functioning of the social group” and runs counter to our social nature, or in terms of how 
it “robs” someone of future enjoyment or how it violates autonomy; rather, the horror primarily 
concerns the violation of human life itself, where there is properly a sense of something sacred or 
reverence-worthy having been violated. Likewise, the horror of sexual violence cannot be 
explained simply in terms of being an “unpleasant experience,” or in terms of violating consent, 
since we need to explain why this violation is so much worse than other violations of consent; 
again, we need the language of the sacred or reverence-worthy, since there is rightly a sense of 
desecration here. We might make a similar case with regard to other examples, but the general 
point is that we should recognize the apparent validity of a common anti-consequentialist moral 
perception involving a sense of the sacred or the reverence-worthy.   
 
 
Absolute Prohibitions without the Sacred? 
 
But might there be other ways of affirming absolute prohibitions apart from invoking the sacred? 
Sabina Lovibond – who we saw raised the issue of anti-naturalism – seeks to defend absolute 
prohibitions not only apart from divine law and divine promises, but also apart from appeals to 
the sacred or the reverence-worthy. Instead, she attempts to show how such prohibitions can be 
seen as an important part of a tradition-informed ethical way of life. She writes:  
 
The customs of our ethical ‘ancestors’, interpreted as best we can from our own historical 
standpoint and held up to scrutiny against the background of a constant awareness of our 
own limitations: … these seem to be the available sources for a code of human conduct 
within which some actions would be excluded from consideration, though not because a 
supreme being had given orders to that effect. … [Some] people … manage to remain at 
their posts—to keep the ‘commandments’ of the morality they acknowledge—even 
without hope: at any rate without the hope that things will turn out all right for them … 
How do they do it; what is their incentive? Perhaps it is simply that they have become 
accustomed, or even attached, to the post in question and lack the desire to make 
alternative arrangements.43 
 
Stuart Hampshire similarly writes about how certain “conduct is impossible as destroying the 
ideal of a way of life that one aspires to and respects, as being, for example, utterly unjust or 
cruel or treacherous or corruptly dishonest.”44 David Wiggins also writes about being “bound by 
our moral nature, i.e., bound by those sentiments without which … we should not recognize 
ourselves.”45 In all of these cases the idea is that avoiding certain actions is a necessary condition 
(a “practical necessity”) for maintaining our moral identities. However, we can ask the further 
question: why should I have this (or that) particular moral identity? 
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The worry about the contingency of our moral beliefs can again arise here, which if 
recognized can have a deflationary effect, since, as discussed in the previous section, recognizing 
this contingency can seem to be in tension with recognizing the normative authority of morality. 
Perhaps one way to get around this worry about contingency is if we can show that our moral 
beliefs (and thus our moral identities) are at least partially based on what we think we need in 
order not to fall into a state of moral anarchy where everything is permitted. Hampshire seems to 
take this approach when he writes: “In arguing against utilitarians I must dwell a little on these 
epithets usually associated with morally impossible action, on a sense of disgrace, of outrage, of 
horror, of baseness, of brutality, and, most important, a sense that a barrier, assumed to be firm 
and almost insurmountable, has been knocked over, and a feeling that, if this horrible, or 
outrageous, or squalid, or brutal action is possible, then anything is possible and nothing is 
forbidden, and all restraints are threatened.”46 But such epithets themselves depend upon there 
being features of the world that make them appropriate and which demand certain responses, and 
they can’t just be based on the thought that without certain moral beliefs we will fall into moral 
anarchy, which is a consequentialist form of reasoning (akin to rule-utilitarianism) and so cannot 
be used to argue against consequentialism. Consider again the case of murder. What is horrible 
about murder isn’t simply that if we allow it then we will fall into a state of moral anarchy 
(though this may be true, at least if it becomes widespread enough); rather, as Anscombe says, 
“the wrong done in murder is done first and foremost to the victim.” And to make sense of this 
wrong we need to appeal to the sacredness or reverence-worthiness of human life such that it is 
properly regarded as being inviolable. The objection to murder, then, is “supra-utilitarian.” My 
general line of contention seems to hold: in order to justify and make sense of absolute 
prohibitions we need to appeal to the sacred or the reverence-worthy. 
Wiggins seems to acknowledge this by making conceptual space for a sense of the 
mysteriousness of human life, where this is equivalent to a sense of sacredness. Central to our 
“moral nature,” he thinks, is a capacity for solidarity that responds to the “indefinable influence” 
that other human beings have upon us (which recalls Anscombe’s “mystical perception” and 
Diamond’s comments about solidarity and its connection to “the sense of mystery surrounding 
our lives”).47 This solidarity involves a “primitive aversion from acts that appear as a direct 
assault by one personal being upon another, acts such as murder, wounding, injury, plunder, 
pillage, the harming of innocents, the repaying of good with gratuitous evil, false witness … 
[Such] acts pass beyond the valuations bad, disappointing, … lamentable, and trespass onto the 
ground marked forbidden.”48 To go against such solidarity by failing to recognize some actions 
as “utterly forbidden,” Wiggins maintains, “menaces the very fabric of the ethical by threatening 
to destroy the basis of the ethical in solidarity.”49 I take his concern here not just to be about 
falling into moral anarchy, but more fundamentally it is about lacking proper responsiveness to 
other human beings. This suggests that a lack of acknowledgement of absolute prohibitions is 
much more corrosive to the ethical life than MacIntyre acknowledges in the passage cited earlier. 
The sort of solidarity to which Wiggins appeals and which involves recognition of some actions 
as “utterly forbidden” (especially in relation to human life) is at “the root of the ethical” in that it 
is the condition for the possibility of any viable ethical life whatsoever. Wiggins writes: “Human 
solidarity … is not an ordinary human pursuit. Its role is to condition, to civilize, and to 
humanize human pursuits.”50  
We can also see such solidarity as a path of re-enchantment in that it enables proper 
recognition of the sacredness or reverence-worthiness of every human life. This is a path not 
taken both in consequentialist moral frameworks such as utilitarianism and in the disenchanted 
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version of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. Utilitarians like Peter Singer depend upon human 
solidarity for whatever appeal their quality of life assessments possess, but they end up 
undermining this solidarity in their willingness to come out against their fellows whenever it 
serves some supposedly more beneficial outcome in terms of overall quality of life.51 They are 
clearly not properly responsive to the sacredness of every human life. The disenchanted version 
of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics also overlooks the sort of solidarity whereby we can become 
properly responsive to the sacredness of every human life; it overlooks this by virtue of its denial 
of a special realm of obligation and because of its disengaged approach that focuses on what 
conduces to human flourishing where this is understood on analogy with the flourishing of other 
living things. To regard such solidarity as being at the root of the ethical life is to take an 
engaged approach that reveals to us a special realm of obligation containing a “peculiar” force 
that is derived from the sacredness and “indefinable influence” of every human life.52  
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